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Results are reported of the ﬁrst natural ﬁeld experiment on the
dictator game, where subjects are unaware that they participate in an
experiment. In contrast to predictions of the standard economic model,
dictators show a large degree of pro-social behavior. This paper builds
a bridge from the laboratory to the ﬁeld to explore how predictive
ﬁndings from the laboratory are for the ﬁeld. External validity is re-
markably high. In all experiments, subjects display an equally high
amount of pro-social behavior, whether they are students or not, par-
ticipate in a laboratory or not, or are aware that they participate in
an experiment or not.
Key words: altruism, natural ﬁeld experiment, external validity.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C70, C91, C93, D63, D64.
∗I would like to thank Aur´ elien Baillon, Han Bleichrodt, Enrico Diecidue, Dennie van
Dolder, Ido Erev, Emir Kamenica, John List, Steven Levitt, Wieland M¨ uller, Charles
Noussair, Drazen Prelec, Kirsten Rohde, Ingrid Rohde, and participants from seminars
at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the University of Chicago for their useful com-
ments. Special thanks to Jan Potters and Peter Wakker for some signiﬁcant contributions.
Finally, I would like to thank Thibault van Heeswijk for his excellent research assistance.
†Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. E-
mail: stoop@ese.eur.nl
11 Introduction
One of the most inﬂuential experiments in economics is the dictator game
(Kahneman et al. (1986), Forsythe et al. (1994)). A ‘dictator’ is endowed
with an amount of money and is matched with an anonymous recipient. The
task of the dictator is to determine how much money to give to the recipient.
Conventional economic theory predicts that the dictator will give no money
at all to the recipient, but empirically this prediction is often violated. Be-
havior in the dictator game therefore poses a fundamental challenge to the
standard economic model. Given the simplicity of the experiment, confusion
on the part of subjects cannot explain why conventional economic theory
does not predict well. Behavior in this game is usually explained by altru-
ism or a willingness to conform to social norms (the latter is also referred to
as ‘manners’ (Camerer and Thaler (1995))). As a result, theorists have al-
tered the standard economic model. Motivations such as altruism, fairness,
inequity aversion and reciprocity have been incorporated into new models.1
All evidence regarding behavior in the dictator game has so far come from
laboratory experiments. Critics have argued that laboratory experiments
on pro-social preferences produce biased outcomes, because of scrutiny or
obtrusiveness by the experimenter.2 Some studies have indeed shown that
pro-social behavior decreases when subjects are unaware of the presence of
an experimenter (List (2006b), Benz and Meier (2008), see Bandiera et al.
(2005) for a non-experimental study on monitoring). Whether experimenter
scrutiny also aﬀects behavior in the dictator game is as yet unexplored.
This paper reports the ﬁrst results of a dictator game in a natural ﬁeld
experiment. A random sample of subjects in a Dutch city receive a trans-
parent envelope with cash due to a supposed misdelivery. They are thus
placed in the role of dictator, because they can decide to return part or
all of the cash to the addressed recipient. In this experiment, the subjects
are unaware that their behavior is recorded by an experimenter. Additional
1Classic references are Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), Andreoni and Miller (2002), and Charness and Rabin (2002).
2See Levitt and List (2007a, 2007b, 2008), and List (2009), but see Falk and Heckman
(2009), Camerer (2011), and Kessler and Vesterlund (2011).
2experiments are conducted to identify possible diﬀerences between this nat-
urally observed behavior and ﬁndings in the laboratory. These experiments
are conducted with student subjects in a laboratory, and with subjects from
the same Dutch city in either a laboratory or their home.
The results are that half of the subjects in the natural ﬁeld experiment
return the envelope. The other experiments show similar results. Therefore,
standard economic theory is refuted in the ﬁeld as much as it is in the lab-
oratory. Furthermore, this paper shows that in some settings the predictive
power of laboratory ﬁndings is supported.
2 Building a bridge
2.1 General description of the experiments
In all experiments in this paper, each subject receives one transparent en-
velope with a ‘thank you’ card and two notes of e5. From the outside of
the envelope, the money is clearly visible, as well as the text written on
the card. This text reads: ‘To you and all others, thank you very much for
your voluntary services.— Tilburg University’. Each transparent envelope
is stamped and addressed to a volunteer of Tilburg University. The sub-
jects are informed that Tilburg University intends to thank its volunteers
by sending the envelope. The task that the subjects in the experiments face,
is whether or not to send the card to one of Tilburg University’s volunteers.
All experiments are conducted in Tilburg, the Netherlands.
In four experiments, a bridge is constructed from the laboratory to the
ﬁeld that addresses the external validity of altruism, in agreement with the
principles of Harrison and List (2004) and List (2006b). Table 1 gives an
overview of the experiments.
StuLab is a conventional laboratory experiment: It is conducted in a lab-
oratory with students as subjects. In CitLab, representative citizens rather
than students, are invited into a laboratory. The CitLab experiment isolates
diﬀerences in behavior between the student subject pool and the subjects
in the natural ﬁeld experiment. In CitHome, subjects take the instructions
3Experiment Type Aim of Experiment: Subjects
Abbreviation Measuring altruism with
StuLab Conventional Lab Experiment students in a lab, aware of scrutiny 40
CitLab Artefactual Field Experiment citizens in a lab, aware of scrutiny 40
CitHome Framed Field Experiment citizens at home, aware of scrutiny 40
CitField Natural Field Experiment citizens at home, unaware of scrutiny 40
Table 1 Overview of the experiments.
with them at home, rather than conducting the experiment in a laboratory.
Therefore, CitHome takes place in the same environment as the natural ﬁeld
experiment. A comparison of the CitLab and CitHome experiments isolates
the inﬂuence of the physical environment in which the experiment is played.
CitField is a natural ﬁeld experiment. Rather than handing out instruc-
tions, a post-marked transparent envelope with a thank you card and two
notes of e5 are slipped into someone’s mailbox. The post-marked stamp
makes it seem as though the envelope has arrived due to a misdelivery. The
question to send the card back to the volunteer comes naturally. Since the
subjects in this experiment are unaware that an experiment is taking place,
comparing CitHome with CitField shows the eﬀects of scrutiny on behavior.
2.2 Design of the StuLab, CitLab, and CitHome experiments
Establishing a bridge between the laboratory and the ﬁeld comes with a
number of challenges. The following describes in detail the information and
conditions for the subjects in the StuLab, CitLab and CitHome experiments
(the instructions can be found in Appendix A). The CitField experiment is
taken as a benchmark.
First, the property rights of the card belong to the volunteer in the
CitField experiment. It has been shown in previous research on dictator
game giving that property rights have an impact on pro-social behavior:
The party with the property rights gets the largest surplus (Fahr and Irlen-
busch (2000), Cherry et al. (2002), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), and Heinz
et al. (2011)). Hence, the property rights in the three other experiments
also belong to the volunteers. Each card in those experiments is explicitly
addressed to a volunteer. Information on the type of voluntary work is not
4provided to the subjects. In reality, the volunteers in this study all helped
the Tilburg Sustainability Center of Tilburg University. They assisted with
writing a report on planet Earth, or on how environmentally friendly the
catering services at the campus of Tilburg University are.
Second, because the subjects in the CitField experiment are not aware
that they participate in an experiment, they perceive themselves to be
anonymous. For that reason, the subjects in all the other experiments have
to be anonymous as well. It is known from previous research on social
preferences that the degree of anonymity inﬂuences pro-social behavior. A
higher degree of anonymity makes people more selﬁsh (Hoﬀman et al. (1994),
Laury et al. (1995), Hoﬀman et al. (1996), Johannesson and Persson (2000),
Soetevent (2005)). Anonymity is ensured by implementing a double-blind
procedure. Subjects are explicitly told that their name is not asked, and
that more participants are recruited for the same experiment. The subjects
are then explained that although the experimenter is able to observe the
total number of envelopes that have arrived, no envelope can be linked to a
subject personally.
Third, in the CitField experiment, someone who wants to return the
envelope has to do an eﬀort. A subject must either go physically to the
address of the volunteer, or go to the nearest post oﬃce box to have the
mail company return the envelope. To keep these costs equal in the other
experiments, subjects in the StuLab, CitLab, and CitHome experiments
have to mail or deliver the envelope themselves. It is not possible for subjects
to give the envelope to the experimenter.
Fourth, subjects in the CitField experiment do not receive a show-up fee,
for obvious reasons. Therefore, none of the subjects in the other experiments
are given a show-up fee.
Fifth, in the CitField experiment, subjects are made to believe that the
envelope is obtained randomly due to a misdelivery. The text on the card
reveals that a card has been sent to ‘all other’ volunteers as well. Believing
that a card has been delivered randomly, and that similar cards are sent
to others, may aﬀect pro-social behavior, although it is not clear in which
way. In each of the StuLab, CitLab, and CitHome experiments, 40 subjects
5randomly take their instructions and ‘thank you’ card from a pile of 45
envelopes. Subjects are explained that an unknown amount of envelopes
will be left over after the last subject has taken its envelope, and that all of
those envelopes will be sent out by the experimenter. With this procedure,
the subjects have randomly received a card while knowing that similar cards
are sent to other volunteers, comparable to the CitField experiment.
Sixth, in the StuLab experiment, students know that the money used in
the experiment comes from a university. It may be the case that knowing
who is funding the experiment inﬂuences behavior. Therefore, this informa-
tion is explicitly provided to all participants in all experiments by signing
the card by the university.
Seventh, in the CitField experiment only, the same name and address
of one volunteer is used on all transparent envelopes. This volunteer has a
Dutch last name, and an address close to the city center of Tilburg. The
volunteer is male, although that information is not visible from the card.
The information that the subjects have in CitField inﬂuences the experi-
mental design of the three other experiments in three ways. The ﬁrst way
is that the volunteers used for these experiments also have to live close to
the city center of Tilburg. Falk and Zehnder (2007) show that pro-social
behavior may be inﬂuenced by the district of the recipient. The second way
is that all the volunteers need to have a Dutch last name. Ethnicity of the
receiver in social preference games may inﬂuence decisions (Buchan et al.
(2006), Charness et al. (2007)). The third way is that all volunteers have
to be male, although this information is not made available to the subjects.
Previous research shows that giving to males or females may diﬀer (Eckel
and Grossman (2001), and Solnick (2001)).
Eighth, 88% of the citizens in Tilburg have the Dutch nationality (CBS
(2010)). Therefore, the majority of subjects in the CitField experiment
is Dutch as well. Previous research has shown that people from diﬀerent
cultures behave diﬀerently in social preference experiments (Fershtman and
Gneezy (2001), Henrich et al. (2004), and Herrmann et al. (2008)). Only
Dutch subjects are invited in the other three experiments. A subject is
considered Dutch if he or she is able to read the Dutch instructions used for
6the three experiments.
Ninth, the percentage of males living in Tilburg is 49.64% (CBS (2010)).
Therefore, the division of subjects in the StuLab, CitLab, and CitHome
experiments should be gender balanced (Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)).
The StuLab experiment has 21 males and 19 females, the other two experi-
ments each have 20 males and 20 females.
2.3 Procedure of the StuLab, CitLab and CitHome experi-
ments
Recruitment of subjects for the StuLab experiment was done at the cam-
pus square of Tilburg University. Here, students can be found on all the
disciplines that the university oﬀers: economics, law, the social sciences,
humanities, and theology. The anonymity requirement does not allow gath-
ering speciﬁc background information of the subjects. Starting from 10.00
a.m. and ending at 18.00 p.m., each hour six subjects were recruited. At the
campus square, subjects were asked to participate in an experiment which
lasted only a couple of minutes. No mention was made about any earn-
ings the subjects could make, nor whether they would receive a show-up
fee. Upon arriving at the lab, subjects were asked to randomly pick one
opaque A4 sized envelope from a pile. Each opaque A4 sized envelope con-
tained a set of instructions and a stamped transparent envelope addressed
to a volunteer. Subjects then were directed to a private space, to read the
instructions. After reading the instructions, the subjects were requested to
leave, and take all that they had been given with them.
In the CitLab experiment, recruitment of subjects has been done in the
downtown city hall area of Tilburg. Tilburg has three city halls, one for each
of its districts. The city hall used for this experiment is the one in the center,
the district where the CitField experiment is conducted, and where all the
volunteers live. The city hall oﬀers the advantage that representative citizens
of Tilburg can be recruited. Only subjects are invited who have come to
the city hall to extend their passport or identiﬁcation card. By Dutch law,
each citizen is required to have either one of those two. Therefore, there is
7no selection eﬀect of citizens visiting the city hall. The city hall is closed
on weekends, and is opened daily from 10.00 a.m. until 6.00 p.m., with
the exception of Thursdays, on which it closes at 8.00 p.m. Starting from
10.00 a.m. and ending at 8.00 p.m., each hour four subjects participated in
the CitLab experiment. Subjects were ﬁrst asked whether or not they had
visited the city hall to extend their passport or identiﬁcation card and then
if they wanted to participate in an experiment. Eligible subjects who showed
interest were then asked to randomly take an opaque A4 sized envelope from
a pile, and were shown directions to a lab. This envelope contained a set
of instructions and a stamped transparent envelope addressed to one of the
volunteers. Once the subjects read the instructions in private, they were
asked to leave the lab, and take all that they had been given with them.
The subjects of the CitHome experiment are recruited at the same city
hall in Tilburg, using the same procedure. However, rather than directing
these subjects to a lab, they were asked to take the opaque A4 sized envelope
with them, and read it once they were at home.
The StuLab, CitLab, and CitHome experiments were conducted in May
of 2011.
2.4 Procedure of the CitField experiment
In this experiment a post-marked transparent envelope with two notes of e5
is slipped into a subject’s mailbox. Because the envelope shows a diﬀerent
address than the address of the subject, it seems as if a misdelivery has
taken place. The following randomization procedure is used to determine
the subjects for the CitField experiment. The volunteer’s address ends with
‘...street 27’. Therefore, the envelope is slipped into a mailbox at an address
in the center district of Tilburg that ends with ‘...street 27’. Only streets are
used for which it is plausible that citizens living there would go to the same
city hall as where the subjects are recruited for the CitLab and CitHome
experiments. From a list with all streets of Tilburg, forty streets from the
city center of Tilburg are randomly drawn.
Acquiring a postmark on the envelope is necessary to make a misdelivery
8credible to the subjects. This is accomplished by sending the envelope to the
volunteer’s address ﬁrst, before slipping it into a subject’s mailbox. Note
that the postmark on the envelope marks the date at which the envelope
is processed. Therefore, the envelope is collected the same day from the
volunteer’s address and delivered at a subject’s address. The delivery of the
envelope is done around the same time as the regular mail company delivers
mail, which is in the afternoon. The CitField experiment is conducted in
the last week of April, in May, and the ﬁrst week of June 2011.
2.5 Errors in the delivery process
In all four experiments, an envelope that is not returned to a volunteer can
be at either of two places. It either is in the possession of a subject, or it
can be lost in the delivery proces of the (monopolist) mail company if the
subject decided to send the card by mail. From the data of the experiments,
it is impossible to separate the two alternatives.
To learn about the magnitude of the noise that the mail company poten-
tially adds, transparent envelopes with cash are sent to observe whether or
not they arrive. Envelopes not arrived must be due to errors in the delivery
process. To test for errors, 90 envelopes are sent with two notes of e5. In
a pilot study, 58 envelopes are sent with a note of e10 and a note of e5.
Table 2 gives an overview of the data on the errors in the delivery process.
e10 envelope e15 envelope
Number of transparent envelopes sent 90 58
Number of transparent envelopes received 88 58
Percentage of envelopes received 97.77 100
Table 2 Rate of errors in the delivery process.
Overall, the data shows that the mail company has a delivery rate of
98.65%, close to the rate of 98% it reports on its website. Since this rate is
not 100% there is possibly some noise in the date presented in section 3. It
must be stressed that losing an envelope is independent of the experiment.
Identifying the causal eﬀects of interest are not confounded by this noise.
92.6 Self-selection
In the StuLab, CitLab, and CitHome experiments, subjects are invited to
participate in an experiment. In contrast, the subjects of the CitField exper-
iment are exogenously chosen. If it is true that unobservable predispositions
to participate in an experiment are correlated with altruistic behavior, then
the self-selected laboratory subjects may behave diﬀerently than the sub-
jects in the ﬁeld.
Previous research, however, shows no evidence that self-selection eﬀects
have an impact on pro-social behavior. Using social preference experiments,
Cleave et al. (2011) and Falk et al. (2010) test for participation biases within
student subject pools, and ﬁnd that self-selected subjects are as pro-social
as non-self-selected subjects. Anderson et al. (2010) come to a similar con-
clusion, using a prisoner’s dilemma game with truck drivers. Finally, and
of particular interest to the current study, Bellemare and Kr¨ oger (2007)
look for selection eﬀects within a representative sample of the Dutch popu-
lation. They ﬁnd no correlation between unobservable random component
underlying the decision to participate in an economic experiment (the trust
game), and the unobservable random component underlying the decision to
be pro-social.
3 Data analysis
Figure 1 shows the number of envelopes that have been returned to the
volunteers in all four experiments. As can be seen, the diﬀerence in the
number of envelopes returned by the subjects is small. Result 1 summarizes
this ﬁnding:
Result 1 There is no diﬀerence in the number of envelopes returned by the
subjects in each experiment. The subject pool, physical environment
in which the experiment is conducted, and awareness of scrutiny have
no eﬀect on pro-social behavior.
Support for Result 1: A two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test on the number of
envelopes returned that contain money cannot reject the hypothesis that the
10Figure 1 The number of envelopes returned in the StuLab, CitLab, CitHome
and CitField experiments. In each experiment, forty subjects participated.
‘e10 Envelopes’ are envelopes returned containing the full amount of e10, ‘e5
Envelopes’ are envelopes of which e5 is taken out, ‘e0 Envelopes’ are envelopes
that are returned empty.
four experiments are equal (N1 = 40,N2 = 40,N3 = 40,N4 = 40,p = 0.51).
Also when comparing the experiments pairwise, no diﬀerences can be
found. This is indicated by a series of two-sided Mann-Whitney tests, taking
an independent observation at the subject level, yielding forty observations
in each experiment. There are no diﬀerences in envelopes returned between
StuLab and CitLab (p = 0.32), between CitLab and CitHome (p = 0.65),
and between CitHome and CitField (p = 0.37). Likewise, comparing Stu-
Lab and CitField shows that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in envelopes
returned (p = 0.58). The results are qualitatively the same when also the
envelopes are included that are returned without money. ￿
Because the main result is based on the acceptance of the null hypothesis,
power analyses are carried out. A priori, a sample of 40 allows to detect an
eﬀect size of at least 57% with a signiﬁcance level of ﬁve percent and a power
of eighty percent (Faul et al., 2007). The diﬀerences in behavior reported
in Figure 1 are so small that even if they were statistically signiﬁcant, they
11are economically insigniﬁcant. The StuLab and CitLab experiments show
a diﬀerence with CitField of approximately ﬁve percent. To make such a
diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant (with a signiﬁcance level of ﬁve percent and
a power of eighty percent), the number of observations in each experiment
would have to be 1,296.
In appendix B more analyses are presented, with signiﬁcant outcomes,
that look at issues other than return rates between the experiments.
4 Discussion
The results reported here show that experimenter scrutiny has no eﬀect
on pro-social behavior, unlike other studies on the eﬀects of monitoring
(Bandiera et al. (2005), List (2006a), Benz and Meier (2008)). A number of
reasons can be given for this diﬀerence.
First, two important features of the natural ﬁeld experiment that may
have an eﬀect on pro-social behavior are the recipient’s property rights and
the eﬀort on the part of pro-social dictators. These factors are uncommon
in laboratory settings (and absent in the classical dictator game), and may
be stronger than the eﬀects of scrutiny.
Second, this study uses a double blind procedure in all experiments, while
the other studies use single blind procedures in their laboratory experiments.
Subjects in double blind experiments may act as if the experimenter is not
present at all, which mitigates the eﬀects of scrutiny.
Finally, the aforementioned three studies show a ﬁeld setting where the
eﬀects of anti-social behavior are not directly observable by a selﬁsh subject.
In this study, to the contrary, a selﬁsh dictator knows exactly what monetary
losses the recipient suﬀers. Because of this transparency, subjects may be
forced to think harder about their potential selﬁsh behavior. If so, then
the transparency of the experimental task may be an important factor for
lab-ﬁeld generalizability, like experimenter scrutiny. Disentangling these
diﬀerences is a useful topic for future research.
125 Conclusion
This paper reports the ﬁrst results of a dictator game in a natural ﬁeld
experiment. In the main experiment, a random sample in a Dutch city
receives a transparent envelope with cash in their mailbox, due to a supposed
misdelivery. These dictators can then choose to return part or all of the
cash in the envelope to the addressed recipient, but are unaware that an
experiment is taking place. Other experiments are carried out to build a
bridge, step by step, from the laboratory to the ﬁeld. The bridge starts
in a laboratory with student subjects. They have to decide to send an
envelope with cash to the person addressed on it. In the second step of
the bridge, the student subjects in the laboratory are replaced by subjects
from a Dutch city. In the third experiment, the laboratory is replaced for
a subject’s home, but the subject is still aware that behavior is monitored.
The fourth and ﬁnal experiment is the main one, as described before. This
bridge of experiments identiﬁes the inﬂuences of the subject pool (students
versus citizens), physical environment (the laboratory versus home), and
awareness of being part of an experiment.
The results show that behavior is the same in all four experiments:
roughly half of the subjects in each experiment return the full amount of
money. These ﬁndings are of importance to theorists, because the stan-
dard economic model is refuted in the ﬁeld as much as it is in the labora-
tory. This ﬁnding motivates the need to model other-regarding preferences
into economic theory. The results are also of importance to experimen-
tal economists, because the results support the relevance of ﬁndings in the
laboratory for the ﬁeld.
13Appendix A: Experimental instructions of the Stu-
Lab, CitLab, and CitHome experiments
This appendix contains the instructions used in the StuLab, CitLab and
CitHome experiments. The instructions are translated from Dutch. The
sentences between curly brackets are omitted in the CitHome experiment.
Dear participant,
Welcome to this study of Tilburg University. Before the study begins, we
want to tell you two things. First, your participation to this study is fully
anonymous. At the start of this study, we did not ask your name. Also
when the study ends, we will not ask your name. Second, it is not allowed
for us as researchers to lie to participants in a study. These instructions are
written truthfully.
• You have received a transparent envelope. The transparent envelope
contains a card and two notes of e5.
• As you can see, the transparent envelope is addressed to someone else.
A while ago, this person has performed voluntary services for Tilburg
University. This envelope is a thank you for the volunteer.
The procedure
• You have randomly taken the transparent envelope in front of you from
a pile of envelopes. All transparent envelopes in this pile are addressed
to volunteers of Tilburg University.
• More participants participate in this study. All other participants
of this study also randomly take a transparent envelope from this
pile. However, the number of envelopes from this pile is greater than
the total number of participants. Some envelopes will therefore be
left over. These will be sent by Tilburg University to the addressed
volunteers.
14• {As soon as you ﬁnish reading these instructions carefully, take the
transparent envelope with you from the laboratory.}
The experiment
• Make a decision whether or not you want to send the transparent
envelope to the addressed volunteer.
• {When you have left the laboratory (with the transparent envelope),}
execute your decision. (In case you want to send the envelope, you
have to do that yourself. You can’t let us do that.)
Anonymity
• We want to stress that your participation in this study is fully anony-
mous.
• We can verify the total number of transparent envelopes that has been
sent by all participants of this study. However, in no way can we make
a link between you personally and the transparent envelope which you
have taken (randomly) from the pile.
{You are now kindly requested to leave the laboratory, with the transparent
envelope. Thank you for your participation.}
15Appendix B: Additional analyses
Appendix B.1: Time before an envelope arrives
For each experiment, it is recorded how many days it takes for an envelope
to arrive at the address of a volunteer. The average and median number of
days it takes for each experiment is displayed in the table below (only the
envelopes that contained cash are reported).
StuLab CitLab CitHome CitField
Average days before an envelope is returned 3.13 4.41 3.67 4.65
Median days before an envelope is returned 1 2 2.5 3
Table 3 Days it takes before an envelope containing cash is returned in the
StuLab, CitLab, CitHome, and CitField experiment.
Result B1 The number of days it takes before an envelope is returned
diﬀers between experiments.
Support for Result B1: A two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hy-
pothesis of an equal return time over the four experiments (N1 = 23,N2 =
17,N3 = 16,N4 = 20,p = 0.06). For this test, only envelopes are included
that contain money. The diﬀerence in delivery time is driven by the diﬀer-
ence between the StuLab and CitField experiment, as is shown by a two-
sided Mann-Whitney test (N1 = 23,N2 = 20,p = 0.05). Mann-Whitney
tests between other experiments show no signiﬁcant results. Including all
envelopes, also those returned without money, gives qualitatively similar re-
sults. ￿
A reason for the longer delivery time of envelopes in the CitField exper-
iment may be that subjects were not at home when an envelope was slipped
in the mail box. Alternatively, it may be the case that knowingly partici-
pating in an experiment promotes a sense of urgency in the decision making
process.
16Appendix B.2: Returned envelopes in CitField
In the CitField experiment, the serial number on each of the two notes of e5
is recorded. Therefore, an envelope that is returned in this experiment can
be linked to the street where it is ‘misdelivered’. An interesting question is
whether the propensity to return an envelope is inﬂuenced by the physical
distance between the address of the subject and that of the volunteer.
Result B2 In the CitField experiment, there is no correlation between re-
turning an envelope, and the physical distance between subject and
volunteer.
Support for Result B2: A two-sided Spearman’s correlation test between
returning an envelope and physical distance has a value of −0.154, but is
insigniﬁcant (N = 40,p = 0.34). ￿
Subjects have two ways of returning an envelope to the volunteer: they
can bring it back personally (perhaps by hoping to evoke the prospect of
future interaction, see for example Leider et al. (2009)), or return it through
the mail company. Out of the twenty envelopes that were returned in the
CitField experiment, eleven were delivered personally and nine through mail.
It is expected that subjects who live more closely to the volunteer’s address
are more likely to return the envelope personally. This is conﬁrmed by result
B3:
Result B3 Conditional on returning an envelope, there is a signiﬁcant cor-
relation between returning an envelope personally and physical dis-
tance between subject and volunteer.
Support for Result B3: A one-sided Spearman’s correlation test between
physical distance and returning an envelope personally has a value of −0.402,
and is signiﬁcant (N = 20,p = 0.04). ￿
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